Detection Rule Engineering (MITRE ATT&CK)
Authoring analytics mapped to MITRE ATT&CK to detect ransomware, lateral movement, and persistence — with attacker-informed tuning.
Sanitized case study — lab / generalized evidence only
Problem
Generic detections miss real attacker behavior and drown analysts in noise. Detections need to map to concrete techniques and hold up against evasion.
Scope
- Detection analytics mapped to ATT&CK techniques
- Endpoint and Windows security telemetry (lab / generalized)
- No employer-specific rule logic or internal thresholds disclosed
Tools
Methodology
- 1Threat modeling
Select high-priority techniques (execution, lateral movement, persistence, impact) based on realistic adversary behavior.
- 2Authoring
Write analytics against the relevant telemetry and express them portably where possible (e.g. Sigma) for reuse.
- 3Validation
Generate benign and malicious-style activity in the lab to confirm true positives and measure noise.
- 4Tuning
Refine conditions and correlation to cut false positives while preserving detection of the underlying technique.
Result & Impact
- Coverage across multiple ATT&CK techniques with attacker-informed logic
- Detections validated against simulated activity before deployment
- Reusable, portable rule patterns that are easier to maintain
Evidence (sanitized)
- Sanitized Sigma rule examples (see the Detection Research section)
- ATT&CK coverage matrix (generalized, no internal detail)
Lessons Learned
- Mapping to ATT&CK keeps coverage honest and communicable.
- Detection engineering and offensive research reinforce each other.
- A rule you cannot tune is a rule that will be muted.